Reciprocal Ethics is a novel ethical framework rooted in praxeology, the study of purposeful action. It represents an entirely new paradigm in moral philosophy, placing interaction at the core of universal ethics. Traditional ethical theories often divorce thought from action. Reciprocal Ethics contends that they are two aspects of the same phenomenon in the human experience, removing the traditional boundary between theoretical and practical ethics. The system categorizes all social interaction as either “self-directed” or “other-directed”, and by introducing the concept (...) of "normative signaling" it also exerts legitimate prescriptive power. The theory is a self-consistent, purely descriptive approach to ethics, that suggests that one's actions serve as semiotic signs that signal one's ethical stance in social interaction. Hence actions do not only define individual moral profiles, but also the moral ecosystem within which one actually operates. The theory operates in real time, adapting to the complexity of reality by taking into account uncertainty, incomplete data and social asymmetries. Reconciling elements of consequentialism and deontological theories, Reciprocal Ethics delivers a streamlined, yet comprehensive ethical system for social interaction, offering tangible insights for navigating complex moral dilemmas. By synthesizing descriptive metaethics and normative moral philosophy into one comprehensive formal theory, a bold assertion arises: Reciprocal Ethics becomes the Formal Science of Ethics. (shrink)

The fact that Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin seem to disagree about the ordinary use of words such as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’, ‘voluntarily’, and ‘involuntarily’ has been taken to cast doubt on the methods of ordinary language philosophy. As Benson Mates puts the worry, ‘if agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?’ (Mates 1958, p. 165). In this chapter, we evaluate (...) Mates’s criticism alongside Ryle’s and Austin’s specific claims about the ordinary use of these words, assessing these claims against actual examples of ordinary use drawn from the British National Corpus (BNC). Our evaluation consists in applying a combination of methods: first aggregating judgments about a large set of samples drawn from the corpus, and then using a clustering algorithm to uncover connections between different types of use. In applying these methods, we show where and to what extent Ryle’s and Austin’s accounts of the use of the target terms are accurate as well as where they miss important aspects of ordinary use, and we demonstrate the usefulness of this new combination of methods. At the heart of our approach is a commitment to the idea that systematically looking at actual uses of expressions is an essential component of any approach to ordinary language philosophy. (shrink)

The fact that Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin seem to disagree about the ordinary use of words such as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’, ‘voluntarily’, and ‘involuntarily’ has been taken to cast doubt on the methods of ordinary language philosophy. As Benson Mates puts the worry, ‘if agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?’ (Mates, Inquiry 1:161–171, 1958, p. 165). In this chapter, (...) we evaluate Mates’s criticism alongside Ryle’s and Austin’s specific claims about the ordinary use of these words, assessing these claims against actual examples of ordinary use drawn from the British National Corpus (BNC). Our evaluation consists in applying a combination of methods: first aggregating judgments about a large set of samples drawn from the corpus, and then using a clustering algorithm to uncover connections between different types of use. In applying these methods, we show where and to what extent Ryle’s and Austin’s accounts of the use of the target terms are accurate as well as where they miss important aspects of ordinary use, and we demonstrate the usefulness of this new combination of methods. At the heart of our approach is a commitment to the idea that systematically looking at actual uses of expressions is an essential component of any approach to ordinary language philosophy. (shrink)

Many contemporary accounts of moral status consider an individual's status to be grounded in some cognitive capacity, e.g. the capacity to experience certain states, to reason morally, etc. One proposed cognitive capacity significant particularly to killing, i.e. having a status that precludes being killed absent cause, is the capacity to value one's own life. I argue that considering this a condition for moral status is a mistake, as it would lead to the exclusion of some individuals with mental health problems (...) who are generally considered clear cases. -/- While a cognitive capacities approach may turn out to be generally feasible, that particular cognitive capacity is not. In the course of this discussion I address two conceptual issues, the first regarding what it means to 'value ones life' and the second regarding what conditions must obtain for something to count as a capacity. These conceptual issues, when resolved pursuant to this account of moral status, lead the account to exclude individuals with major depressive disorder, i.e. deny that it is morally wrong to kill such individuals based on their moral status. I then argue that this is a decisive reason to reject this particular cognitive capacity as implicated in moral status. (shrink)

Aunque este volumen es un poco anticuado, hay pocos libros populares recientes que tratan específicamente con la psicología del asesinato y es una visión general rápida disponible por unos pocos dólares, por lo que aún así vale la pena el esfuerzo. No hace ningún intento de ser exhaustiva y es algo superficial en los lugares, con el lector se espera que llene los espacios en blanco de sus muchos otros libros y la vasta literatura sobre la violencia. Para una actualización, (...) véase, por ejemplo, Buss, El Manual de Psicología Evolutiva 2a Ed. v1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270 – 282, 388 – 389, 545 – 546, 547, 566 y Buss, Psicología Evolutiva 5º Ed. (2015) p 26, 96 – 97223, 293-4, 300, 309 – 312, 410 y Shackelford y Hansen , La evolución de la violencia (2014). Ha estado entre los mejores psicólogos evolutivos durante varias décadas y cubre una amplia gama de comportamientos en sus obras, pero aquí se concentra casi enteramente en los mecanismos psicológicos que causan que las personas individuales asesinen y sus posibles función evolutiva en el EEE (medio ambiente de adaptación evolutiva — i. e., las llanuras de África durante los últimos millones de años). -/- Los Buss comienzan señalando que como con otros comportamientos, las explicaciones ' alternativas ' como la psicopatología, los celos, el entorno social, las presiones grupales, las drogas y el alcohol, etc. no explican realmente, ya que la pregunta sigue siendo en cuanto a por qué estos producen impulsos homicidas, es decir, son las causas próximas y no las últimas evolutivas (genéticas). Como siempre, inevitablemente se reduce a la aptitud inclusiva (selección de parientes), y por lo tanto a la lucha por el acceso a los compañeros y recursos, que es la máxima explicación para todos los comportamientos en todos los organismos. Los datos sociológicos (y el sentido común) aclaran que los machos más pobres son los más propensos a matar. Él presenta sus propios y otros datos de homicidios de las naciones industrializadas, y las culturas tribales, la matanza conespecífica en animales, la arqueología, los datos del FBI y su propia investigación sobre las fantasías homicidas de las personas normales. Mucha evidencia arqueológica continúa acumulando asesinatos, incluyendo el de grupos enteros, o de grupos menos mujeres jóvenes, en tiempos prehistóricos. -/- Después de examinar los comentarios de Buss, presento un breve resumen de la psicología intencional (la estructura lógica de la racionalidad), que se cubre extensamente en mis muchos otros artículos y libros. -/- Aquellos con mucho tiempo que quieran una historia detallada de violencia homicida desde una perspectiva evolutiva pueden consultar a Steven Pinker ' los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza por qué la violencia ha disminuido ' (2012), y mi revisión de ella, fácilmente disponible en la red y en dos de mis libros recientes. Brevemente, Pinker señala que el asesinato ha disminuido de manera constante y dramática por un factor de alrededor de 30 desde nuestros días como forrajeras. Por lo tanto, a pesar de que las armas ahora hacen que sea extremadamente fácil matar a alguien, el homicidio es mucho menos común. Pinker piensa que esto se debe a varios mecanismos sociales que traen a cabo nuestros "mejores ángeles", pero creo que se debe principalmente a la abundancia temporal de recursos de la violación despiadada de nuestro planeta, junto con una mayor presencia policial, con la comunicación y sistemas de vigilancia y jurídicos que hacen que sea mucho más probable que sea castigado. Esto se hace claro cada vez que hay incluso una ausencia breve y local de la policía. -/- Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Entender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky y otras. (shrink)

Anche se questo volume è un po 'datato, ci sono pochi libri popolari recenti che si occupano specificamente della psicologia dell'omicidio ed è una rapida panoramica disponibile per pochi dollari, quindi ne vale comunque la pena. Non fa alcun tentativo di essere completo ed è un po ' superficiale in alcuni punti, con il lettore che si aspetta di riempire gli spazi vuoti dai suoi molti altri libri e la vasta letteratura sulla violenza. Per un aggiornamento vedere ad esempio, Buss, (...) Il Manuale di Psicologia Evolutiva 2nd ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 e Buss, Psicologia Evolutiva 5th ed. (2015) p. 26, 96-97.223, 293-4, 300, 309-312, 410 e Shackelford e Hansen, L'evoluzione della violenza (2014).. È stato tra i migliori psicologi evoluzionisti per diversi decenni e copre una vasta gamma di comportamenti nelle sue opere, ma qui si concentra quasi interamente sui meccanismi psicologici che causano l'omicidio delle singole persone e la loro possibile funzione evolutiva nel SEE (Ambiente dell'adattamento evolutivo, cioè le pianure dell'Africa durante gli ultimi milioni di anni o giù di lì). Gli Buss iniziano notando che, come per altri comportamenti, spiegazioni "alternative" come la psicopatologia, la gelosia, l'ambiente sociale, le pressioni di gruppo, le droghe e l'alcol ecc. non spiegano realmente, poiché rimane la questione del motivo per cui questi producono impulsi omicidi, cioè sono le cause prossipate e non quelle evolutive finali (genetiche). Come sempre, inevitabilmente si riduce alla forma fisica inclusiva (selezione dei parenti), e così alla lotta per l'accesso agli accoppiamenti e alle risorse, che è la spiegazione finale per tutti i comportamenti in tutti gli organismi. I dati sociologici (e il buon senso) chiariscono che i maschi più giovani sono i più propensi ad uccidere. Presenta i suoi e altri dati omicidi provenienti da nazioni industrializzate, e culture tribali, uccisioni aspecifiche conspecifiche in animali, archeologia, dati dell'FBI e la propria ricerca sulle fantasie omicidi delle persone normali. Molte prove archeologiche continuano ad accumularsi di omicidi, tra cui quello di interi gruppi, o di gruppi meno giovani femmine, in epoca preistorica. Dopo aver esaminato i commenti di Buss, presento una brevissima sintesi della psicologia intenzionale (la struttura logica della razionalità), che è ampiamente trattata nei miei molti altri articoli e libri. Coloro che hanno un sacco di tempo che vogliono una storia dettagliata della violenza omicida da una prospettiva evolutiva possono consultare 'The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined' di Steven Pinker e la mia recensione, facilmente disponibile in rete e in due dei miei ultimi libri. In breve, Pinker osserva che l'omicidio è diminuito costantemente e drammaticamente di un fattore di circa 30 dai nostri giorni come raccoglitori. Quindi, anche se le armi ora rendono estremamente facile per chiunque uccidere, la omicidio è molto meno comune. Pinker pensa che ciò sia dovuto a vari meccanismi sociali che mettono in evidenza i nostri "angeli migliori", ma penso che sia dovuto principalmente all'abbondanza temporanea di risorse dallo stupro spietato del nostro pianeta, insieme a una maggiore presenza della polizia, con la comunicazione e la sorveglianza e i sistemi legali che rendono molto più probabile essere puniti. Questo diventa chiaro ogni volta che c'è anche una breve e locale assenza della polizia. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019). (shrink)

Dies ist eine ausgezeichnete Überprüfung der Gen-/Umgebungsinteraktionen auf das Verhalten und ist, obwohl sie etwas veraltet ist, eine einfache und lohnende Lektüre. Sie beginnen mit Zwillingsstudien, die den überwältigenden Einfluss der Genetik auf das Verhalten zeigen. Sie stellen die immer bekannter werdenden Studien von Judith Harris fest, die die Fakten erweitern und zusammenfassen, dass die gemeinsame häusliche Umgebung fast keinen Einfluss auf das Verhalten hat und dass adoptierte Kinder so anders wachsen als ihre Stiefbrüder und -schwestern wie zufällig ausgewählte Menschen. (...) Ein grundlegender Punkt, den sie (und fast alle, die über Verhaltensgenetik diskutieren) nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen, ist, dass die Hunderte (Tausende je nach Standpunkt) menschlicher Verhaltensuniversalen, einschließlich aller Grundlagen unserer Persönlichkeiten, zu 100% von unseren Genen bestimmt werden, ohne Variation in normalen Werten. Jeder sieht einen Baum als Baum und nicht als Stein, sucht und isst Nahrung, wird wütend und eifersüchtig usw. Worüber sie hier also meistens sprechen, ist, wie viel Umwelt (Kultur) das Ausmaß beeinflussen kann, in dem verschiedene Merkmale gezeigt werden, und nicht ihr Aussehen. Schließlich diskutieren sie die Eugenik in der üblichen politisch korrekten Weise, ohne festzustellen, dass wir und alle Organismen die Produkte der Eugenik der Natur sind und dass Versuche, die natürliche Selektion mit Medizin, Landwirtschaft und Zivilisation als Ganzes zu besiegen, für jede Gesellschaft, die dies weiterhin tut,katastrophalsind. Bis zu 50 % aller Empfängnisse oder etwa 100 Millionen pro Jahr enden in einer frühen spontanen Abtreibung, fast alle ohne Dassmund die Mutter. Diese natürliche Keulung defekter Gene treibt die Evolution an, hält uns relativ genetisch gesund und macht die Gesellschaft möglich. Dysgenös ist ausreichend, um die Zivilisation zu zerstören, aber Überbevölkerung wirdd o eszuerst. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2017' 3rd ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing specifically with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview available for a few dollars, so still well worth the effort. It makes no attempt to be comprehensive and is somewhat superficial in places, with the reader expected to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the vast literature on violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd (...) ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 and Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 and Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). He has been among the top evolutionary psychologists for several decades and covers a wide range of behavior in his works, but here he concentrates almost entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause individual people to murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during the last million years or so). -/- Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations such as psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, drugs and alcohol etc. do not really explain, since the question still remains as to why these produce homicidal impulses, i.e., they are the proximate causes and not the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. As always, it inevitably boils down to inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle for access to mates and resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all behavior in all organisms. Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear that younger poorer males are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and others homicide data from industrialized nations, and tribal cultures, conspecific killing in animals, archeology, FBI data and his own research into normal people's homicidal fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues to accumulate of murders, including that of whole groups, or of groups minus young females, in prehistoric times. -/- After surveying Buss’s comments, I present a very brief summary of intentional psychology (the logical structure of rationality), which is covered extensively in my many other articles and books. -/- Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence from an evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined’(2012), and my review of it, easily available on the net and in two of my recent books. Briefly, Pinker notes that murder has decreased steadily and dramatically by a factor of about 30 since our days as foragers. So, even though guns now make it extremely easy for anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker thinks this is due to various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better angels’, but I think it’s due mainly to the temporary abundance of resources from the merciless rape of our planet, coupled with increased police presence, with communication and surveillance and legal systems that make it far more likely to be punished. This becomes clear every time there is even a brief and local absence of the police. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Embora este volume é um pouco datado, há poucos livros populares recentes lidando especificamente com a psicologia do assassinato e é uma visão rápida disponível para alguns dólares, por isso ainda vale bem o esforço. Não faz nenhuma tentativa de ser detalhado e é um tanto superficial nos lugares, com o leitor esperado preencher os espaços em branco de seus muitos outros livros e a literatura vasta na violência. Para uma atualização ver, por exemplo, Buss, O Manual de Psicologia Evolucionária (...) 2ª ed. v1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270 – 282, 388 – 389, 545 – 546, 547, 566 e Buss, Psicologia Evolutiva 5º Ed. (2015) p 26, 96 – 97223, 293-4, 300, 309 – 312, 410 e Shackelford e Hansen , A Evolução da Violência (2014).Ele está entre os principais psicólogos evolucionários por várias décadas e abrange uma ampla gama de comportamentos em suas obras, mas aqui ele se concentra quase inteiramente sobre os mecanismos psicológicos que causam pessoas individuais a assassinar e seus possíveis função evolutiva no EEE (ambiente de adaptação evolutiva — i. e., as planícies da África durante os últimos milhões de anos ou mais). Buss começa por notar que, como com outros comportamentos, explicações ' alternativas ', tais como psicopatologia, ciúme, ambiente social, pressões de grupo, drogas e álcool, etc. não realmente explicam, uma vez que a questão ainda permanece a respeito de por que estes produzem impulsos homicida, ou seja, são as causas proximas e não as últimas evolutivas (genéticas). Como sempre, ele inevitavelmente se resume a aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes), e assim a luta pelo acesso a companheiros e recursos, que é a explicação definitiva para todo o comportamento em todos os organismos. Os dados sociológicos (e o senso comum) tornam claro que os machos mais pobres mais jovens são os mais propensos a matar. Ele apresenta seus próprios e outros dados de homicídio de nações industrializadas, e culturas tribais, morte conespecífica em animais, arqueologia, dados do FBI e sua própria pesquisa sobre as fantasias homicida das pessoas normais. Muita evidência arqueológica continua a acumular-se de assassinatos, incluindo o de grupos inteiros, ou de grupos menos jovens fêmeas, em tempos pré-históricos. Depois de examinar os comentários de Buss, apresento um breve resumo da psicologia intencional (a estrutura lógica da racionalidade), que é amplamente coberta em meus muitos outros artigos e livros. Aqueles com um monte de tempo que querem uma história detalhada de violência homicida de uma perspectiva evolutiva pode consultar Steven Pinker ' os melhores 2 anjos da nossa natureza por que a violência diminuiu ' (2012), e minha revisão do mesmo, facilmente disponível na net e em dois dos meus livros recentes. Momentaneamente, Pinker observa que o assassinato diminuiu firmemente e dramàtica por um fator de aproximadamente 30 desde nossos dias como Foragers. Assim, mesmo que as armas agora tornam extremamente fácil para qualquer um matar, homicídio é muito menos comum. Pinker acha que isso é devido a vários mecanismos sociais que trazem os nossos "melhores anjos", mas eu acho que é devido principalmente à abundância temporária de recursos do estupro implacável do nosso planeta, juntamente com a presença policial aumentada, com a comunicação e vigilância e sistemas jurídicos que fazem com que seja muito mais provável que seja punido. Isto torna-se claro cada vez que há mesmo uma breve e local ausência da polícia. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. (shrink)

हालांकि इस मात्रा में थोड़ा दिनांकित है, वहाँ कुछ हाल ही में लोकप्रिय हत्या के मनोविज्ञान के साथ विशेष रूप से काम कर रहे हैं और यह एक त्वरित कुछ डॉलर के लिए उपलब्ध सिंहावलोकन है, तो अभी भी अच्छी तरह से प्रयास के लायक. यह व्यापक होने का कोई प्रयास नहीं करता है और स्थानों में कुछ सतही है, पाठक के साथ अपने कई अन्य पुस्तकों और हिंसा पर विशाल साहित्य से रिक्त स्थान में भरने की उम्मीद है. एक (...) अद्यतन के लिए उदाहरण के लिए, Buss, विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान 2 एड की हैंडबुक देखें. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270-282, 388-389, 545-546, 547, 566 और Buss, विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान 5 th ed. (2015) p 26, 96-97,223, 293-4, 300, 309 312, और Hansen1, और Hansen , हिंसा का विकास (2014)|वह कई दशकों के लिए शीर्ष विकासवादी मनोवैज्ञानिकों के बीच किया गया है और अपने काम में व्यवहार की एक विस्तृत श्रृंखला को शामिल किया गया है, लेकिन यहाँ वह मनोवैज्ञानिक तंत्र है कि व्यक्तिगत लोगों की हत्या और उनके संभव कारण पर लगभग पूरी तरह से ध्यान केंद्रित EEA में विकासवादी समारोह (विकासवादी अनुकूलन के पर्यावरण यानी, अफ्रीका के मैदानों पिछले दस लाख वर्षों के दौरान या तो). Buss ध्यान देने योग्य है कि अन्य व्यवहार के साथ के रूप में शुरू होता है, 'वैकल्पिक' इस तरह के मनोविकृति विज्ञान, ईर्ष्या, सामाजिक पर्यावरण, समूह के दबाव, दवाओं और शराब आदि के रूप में स्पष्टीकरण वास्तव में व्याख्या नहीं है, के बाद से सवाल अभी भी क्यों इन उत्पादों के रूप में बनी हुई है घातक आवेगों, अर्थात्, वे निकट कारण हैं और नहीं परम विकासवादी (आनुवंशिक) वाले. हमेशा की तरह, यह अनिवार्य रूप से समावेशी फिटनेस के लिए नीचे फोड़े (किन चयन), और इसलिए साथी और संसाधनों, जो सभी जीवों में सभी व्यवहार के लिए अंतिम विवरण है के लिए उपयोग के लिए संघर्ष करने के लिए. सामाजिक डेटा (और सामान्य ज्ञान) यह स्पष्ट है कि युवा गरीब पुरुषों को मारने के लिए सबसे अधिक संभावना है. वह औद्योगिक देशों से अपने और दूसरों की हत्या डेटा प्रस्तुत करता है, और आदिवासी संस्कृतियों, पशुओं में विशिष्ट हत्या, पुरातत्व, एफबीआई डेटा और सामान्य लोगों की आत्मघाती कल्पनाओं में अपने स्वयं के अनुसंधान. बहुत पुरातात्विक सबूत हत्या के जमा करने के लिए जारी है, पूरे समूहों की है कि सहित, या समूहों के शून्य युवा महिलाओं, प्रागैतिहासिक काल में. है Buss टिप्पणियों का सर्वेक्षण करने के बाद, मैं जानबूझकर मनोविज्ञान का एक बहुत संक्षिप्त सारांश पेश (तर्कसंगतता की तार्किक संरचना), जो बड़े पैमाने पर मेरे कई अन्य लेख और पुस्तकों में कवर किया जाता है. समय की एक बहुत कुछ है जो एक विकासवादी दृष्टिकोण से घातक हिंसा का एक विस्तृत इतिहास चाहते हैं के साथ उन स्टीवन पिंकर 'हमारी प्रकृति के बेहतर एन्जिल्स क्यों हिंसा अस्वीकार कर दिया है परामर्श कर सकते हैं'(2012), और इसके बारे में मेरी समीक्षा, नेट पर आसानी से उपलब्ध और मेरी हाल की पुस्तकों में से दो में. संक्षेप में, पिंकर नोट है कि हत्या के बारे में एक कारक द्वारा तेजी से और नाटकीय रूप से कमी आई है 30 foragers के रूप में हमारे दिनों के बाद से. तो, भले ही बंदूकें अब यह बहुत आसान किसी को मारने के लिए बनाने के लिए, हत्या बहुत कम आम है. पिंकर सोचता है कि यह विभिन्न सामाजिक तंत्र है कि हमारे 'बेहतर स्वर्गदूतों' बाहर लाने के कारण है, लेकिन मुझे लगता है कि यह मुख्य रूप से हमारे ग्रह की बेरहम बलात्कार से संसाधनों की अस्थायी बहुतायत के कारण है, वृद्धि हुई पुलिस की उपस्थिति के साथ युग्मित, संचार के साथ और निगरानी और कानूनी प्रणाली है कि यह कहीं अधिक सजा होने की संभावना है. यह हर बार स्पष्ट हो जाता है वहाँ भी एक संक्षिप्त और स्थानीय पुलिस की अनुपस्थिति है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 5वें एड (2019). (shrink)

Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing specifically with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview available for a few dollars, so still well worth the effort. It makes no attempt to be comprehensive and is somewhat superficial in places, with the reader expected to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the vast literature on violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd (...) ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 and Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 and Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014) He has been among the top evolutionary psychologists for several decades and covers a wide range of behavior in his works, but here he concentrates almost entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause individual people to murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during the last million years or so). -/- Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations such as psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, drugs and alcohol etc. do not really explain, since the question still remains as to why these produce homicidal impulses, i.e., they are the proximate causes and not the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. As always, it inevitably boils down to inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle for access to mates and resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all behavior in all organisms. Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear that younger poorer males are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and others homicide data from industrialized nations, and tribal cultures, conspecific killing in animals, archeology, FBI data and his own research into normal people's homicidal fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues to accumulate of murders, including that of whole groups, or of groups minus young females, in prehistoric times. -/- After surveying Buss’s comments, I present a very brief summary of intentional psychology (the logical structure of rationality), which is covered extensively in my many other articles and books. -/- Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence from an evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined’(2012), and my review of it easily available on the net and in two of my recent ebooks. Briefly, Pinker notes that murder has decreased steadily and dramatically by a factor of about 30 since our days as foragers. So, even though guns now make it extremely easy for anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker thinks this is due to various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better angels’, but I think it’s due mainly to the temporary abundance of resources from the merciless rape of our planet, coupled with increased police presence, with communication and surveillance and legal systems that make it far more likely to be punished. This becomes clear every time there is even a brief and local absence of the police. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems of thought viewpoint may consult my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in more of my writings on psychology may see Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century--Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 392p (2017). For all my writings in their most recent versions, please consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed. 686p (2017). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX -/- . (shrink)

Obwohl dieser Band ein wenig datiert ist, gibt es nur wenige aktuelle populäre Bücher, die sich speziell mit der Psychologie des Mordes beschäftigen und es ist ein schneller Überblick für ein paar Dollar, also noch wert die Mühe. Es macht keinen Versuch, umfassend zu sein und ist stellenweise etwas oberflächlich, wobei der Leser erwartet, die Lücken aus seinen vielen anderen Büchern und der umfangreichen Literatur über Gewalt zu füllen. Für ein Update siehe z.B. Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd (...) ed. V1 (2016) S. 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 und Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) P 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 und Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). Er gehört seit mehreren Jahrzehnten zu den beste Evolutions psychologen und deckt in seinen Arbeiten ein breites Spektrum an Verhaltensweisen ab, aber hier konzentriert er sich fast ausschließlich auf die psychologischen Mechanismen, die einzelne Menschen zum Mord führen, und ihre mögliche evolutionäre Funktion im EWR (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation – d.h. die Ebenen Afrikas in den letzten Millionen Jahren oder so). -/- Buss beginnt mit der Erkenntnis, dass wie bei anderen Verhaltensweisen "alternative" Erklärungen wie Psychopathologie, Eifersucht, soziales Umfeld, Gruppendruck, Drogen und Alkohol usw. nicht wirklich erklären, da die Frage nach wie vor bleibt, warum diese mörderische Impulse erzeugen, d.h. sie sind die nahen Ursachen und nicht die ultimativen evolutionären (genetischen) Ursachen. Wie immer läuft es unweigerlich auf inklusive Fitness (genetische Fitness von Verwandten) und damit auf den Kampf um den Zugang zu Kumpels und Ressourcen hinaus, der die ultimative Erklärung für das gesamte Verhalten in allen Organismen ist. Soziologische Daten (und der gesunde Menschenverstand) machen deutlich, dass jüngere ärmere Männchen am ehesten töten. Er präsentiert seine eigenen und andere Morddaten aus Industrienationen und Stammeskulturen, konspeziertes Töten von Tieren, Archäologie, FBI-Daten und seine eigene Forschung über die Mordfantasien normaler Menschen. Viele archäologische Beweise häufen sich weiterhin von Morden, einschließlich der von ganzen Gruppen oder von Gruppen abzüglich junger Frauen, in prähistorischen Zeiten. -/- Nachdem ich Buss' Kommentare untersucht habe, präsentiere ich eine sehr kurze Zusammenfassung der absichtlichen Psychologie (die logische Struktur der Rationalität), die in meinen vielen anderen Artikeln und Büchern ausführlich behandelt wird. -/- Diejenigen, die viel Zeit haben, die eine detaillierte Geschichte mörderischer Gewalt aus evolutionärer Perspektive wollen, können Steven Pinkers "The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined" (2012) und meineRezension, leicht im Netz und in zwei meiner jüngsten Bücher lesen. Kurz, Pinker stellt fest, dass Mord hat stetig und dramatisch um den Faktor etwa 30 seit unseren Tagen als Forager gesunken. Obwohl Waffen es jetzt für jeden extrem einfach machen, zu töten, ist Tötung viel seltener. Pinker glaubt, dass dies auf verschiedene soziale Mechanismen zurückzuführen ist, die unsere "besseren Engel" hervorbringen, aber ich denke, es ist hauptsächlich auf die vorübergehende Fülle von Ressourcen durch die gnadenlose Vergewaltigung unseres Planeten zurückzuführen, gepaart mit erhöhter Polizeipräsenz, mit Kommunikations- und Überwachungs- und Rechtssystemen, die es viel wahrscheinlicher machen, bestraft zu werden. Dies wird jedes Mal deutlich, wenn es sogar eine kurze und lokale Abwesenheit der Polizei gibt. -/- Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

The past eighteen years witnessed the rapid development of experimental philosophy of language. Adopting a bibliometric approach, this study examines the research trends and status quo of this burgeoning field based on a corpus of 237 publications retrieved from PhilPapers. It is observed that experimental philosophy of language has undergone three stages, the initiation stage, the development stage, and the extension stage, across which there is a clear upward trend in the annual number of publications. Michael Devitt, Edouard Machery, (...) John Turri, Nat Hansen, et al., are found to be the most productive philosophers, testifying their leading positions in this field. Journals, instead of books, are the major homes of works in this area. The analysis also yields a list of influential works, including the seminal work “Semantics, Cross-cultural Style” and other significant publications on the semantics of various types of expressions. Relatedly, the major research themes are found to include not only intuitions about the reference of proper names, but also a wide array of philosophically and linguistically interesting issues like the meaning of color adjectives, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste, the norms of assertions and the essence of lies, etc. These findings showcase that experimental philosophy of language has broadened the research territory and offered deep insights into central issues of philosophy of language that are beyond the reach of the conventional armchair methodology. (shrink)

We discuss two leading theories of distributive justice: egalitarianism and prioritarianism. We argue that while each has particular merits and shortcomings, egalitarian views more fully satisfy a key requirement of distributive justice: respect for both the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.

In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of epistemic contextualism using formal (rather than armchair) experimental methods. By-and-large, the results of these experiments have not supported the original motivation for epistemic contextualism. That is partly because experiments have only uncovered effects of changing context on knowledge ascriptions in limited experimental circumstances (when contrast is present, for example), and partly because existing experiments have not been designed to distinguish between contextualism and one of (...) its main competing theories, subject-sensitive invariantism. In this paper, we discuss how a particular, "third-person", experimental design is needed to provide evidence that would support contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism. In spite of the theoretical significance of third-person knowledge ascriptions for debates surrounding contextualism, no formal experiments evaluating such ascriptions that assess contextualist claims have previously been conducted. In this paper, we conduct an experiment specifically designed to examine that central gap in contextualism’s empirical foundation. The results of our experiment provide crucial support for epistemic contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine two major challenges to epistemic theories of democracy: “the authority dilemma” and “the epistemic gamble.” The first is a conceptual challenge, suggesting that epistemic democracy is inherently self-undermining. The second is a normative challenge, asserting that the case for democracy should not rely on precarious epistemic grounds. I argue that both challenges fail. Thus, epistemic theories of democracy escape two of the most popular objections to this view.

I argue that prioritarianism cannot be assessed in abstraction from an account of the measure of utility. Rather, the soundness of this view crucially depends on what counts as a greater, lesser, or equal increase in a person’s utility. In particular, prioritarianism cannot accommodate a normatively compelling measure of utility that is captured by the axioms of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. Nor can it accommodate a plausible and elegant generalization of this theory that has been (...) offered in response to challenges to von Neumann and Morgenstern. This is, I think, a theoretically interesting and unexpected source of difficulty for prioritarianism, which I explore in this article. (shrink)

According to phenomenalism, physical things are a certain kind of possibility for experience. This paper clarifies the phenomenalist position and addresses some main objections to it, with the aim of showing that phenomenalism is a live option that merits a place alongside dualism and materialism in contemporary metaphysical debate.

I develop a psychological account for how it is that we use imagination to metaphysically modalize, i.e., to reach conclusions about metaphysical modality. Specifically, I argue that Nichols and Stich’s (2003) cognitive theory of imagination can be extended to metaphysical modalizing. I then use the extension to explicate philosophical disagreements about whether a scenario is metaphysically possible. Thereafter, I address Nichols’ (2006) objection that psychologizing imagination makes it clear that imagination is unreliable when used to metaphysically modalize. The end result (...) is a naturalistic account for how imagination enables us to metaphysically modalize. (shrink)

It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a (...) primitive feature of experience, or else as something analyzable into wholly non-phenomenal terms. (shrink)

We review existing strategies for bringing modal intuitions to bear against materialist theories of consciousness, and then propose a new strategy. Unlike existing strategies, which assume that imagination (suitably constrained) is a good guide to modal truth, the strategy proposed here makes no assumptions about the probative value of imagination. However, unlike traditional modal arguments, the argument developed here delivers only the conclusion that we should not believe that materialism is true, not that we should believe that it is false.

Abstract: Scepticism has only two moves to make and each is indefensible.

In all three of his major works on moral philosophy, Kant conceives of moral obligation, moral permissibility, and moral impermissibility in decidedly modal terms, namely in terms of moral necessity, moral possibility, and moral impossibility respectively. This terminology is not Kant’s own, however, but has a rather long history stretching back to a group of Spanish Jesuit theologians in the early seventeenth century, and it was used in two contexts: first, in the context of divine and human action to explain (...) how volition can be both metaphysically and physically free and yet morally necessary, and second in a deontic context to refer to moral obligation, permissibility, and impermissibility. In this paper, my first and primary aim is to sketch the way in which four of Kant’s most important German predecessors, namely Leibniz, Christian Wolff, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, and Christian August Crusius, used the language of moral necessity, possibility, and impossibility in both the context of action and obligation. My second, more limited aim is to suggest that Kant’s use of these terms can be clarified by taking this background into consideration. (shrink)

This essay is a reflection on the idea of truth-making and its applications. I respond to a critique of my 1986 paper on truth-making and discuss some key principles at play in the Truth-maker Program as it has emerged over the past 25 years, paying special attention to negative and general truths. I maintain my opposition to negative and general facts, but give an improved account of how to do without them. In the end, I accept Truth-maker Maximalism and a (...) weakened form of Truth-maker Necessitarianism, reject the assumption that truth-makers must be entities, and urge that the idea of a truth-maker be broadened and loosened so that it applies to anti-realistic as well as realistic truths. (shrink)

In order to establish that judgments about practical reasons can be objective, it is necessary to show that the applicable standards provide an adequate account of truth and error. This in turn requires that these standards yield an extensive set of substantive, publicly accessible judgments that are presumptively true. This output requirement is not satisfied by the standards of universalizability, consistency, coherence, and caution alone. But it is satisfied if we supplement them with the principle that desire is a source (...) of minimal reasons. This principle is justified despite currently fashionable arguments against the claims of desire. (shrink)

Recent research gives perspectivism the status of a stand-alone epistemological research program. As part of this development, it must be distinguished from other epistemologies, especially relativism. Not only do relativists and perspectivists use a similar vocabulary—even the supposed tenets (features of the doctrine) seem to partially overlap. To clarify the relation between these programs, I suggest drawing two important distinctions. The first is between the (1) terminological and (2) doctrinal components of epistemologies, the second between the (2a) analytical and (2b) (...) synthetical doctrinal elements. The method of the originalistic linguistic analysis that I introduce in this article shows that both relativism and perspectivism are using the same matrix of interconnected linguistic expressions that belong to what I call the universal epistemic language. Furthermore, this method reveals which doctrinal components necessarily follow from this linguistic basis and the terms “relativism” and “perspectivism” and which are a result of deliberate philosophical constructions. As for the linguistic basis and analytical doctrinal components, relativism and perspectivism are complementary members of one epistemology. Doctrinal additions that transform the original meaning of the terms “relativism” and “perspectivism”, such as “indifferentism” and “non-absolutism”, should be always explicitly mentioned to avoid confusion and strawmen debates in philosophy. (shrink)

Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full (...) justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief. (shrink)

This article is an explication and defense of Kant’s view that ‘imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself’ (Critique of Pure Reason, A120, fn.). Imagination comes into perception at a far more basic level than Strawson allows, and it is required for the constitution of intuitions (= sense experiences) out of sense impressions. It also plays an important part in explaining how it is possible for intuitions to have intentional contents. These functions do not involve the application of contents, (...) and I offer a schematic account of how they arise from preconceptual synthesis. (shrink)

Movement sonification can improve motor control in both healthy subjects (e.g., learning or refining a sport skill) and those with sensorimotor deficits (e.g., stroke patients and deafferented individuals). It is not known whether improved motor control and learning from movement sonification are driven by feedback-based real-time (“online”) trajectory adjustments, adjustments to internal models over multiple trials, or both. We searched for evidence of online trajectory adjustments (muscle twitches) in response to movement sonification feedback by comparing the kinematics and error of (...) reaches made with online (i.e., real-time) and terminal sonification feedback. We found that reaches made with online feedback were significantly more jerky than reaches made with terminal feedback, indicating increased muscle twitching (i.e., online trajectory adjustment). Using a between-subject design, we found that online feedback was associated with improved motor learning of a reach path and target over terminal feedback; however, using a within-subjects design, we found that switching participants who had learned with online sonification feedback to terminal feedback was associated with a decrease in error. Thus, our results suggest that, with our task and sonification, movement sonification leads to online trajectory adjustments which improve internal models over multiple trials, but which themselves are not helpful online corrections. (shrink)

Four different interpretations of measurement are distinguished that are compatible with the formal frame of the representational theory of measurement: (1) the classical interpretation, the additive, (3) the operationalis, (4) the correlative one.

Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made (...) intelligible by reference to criterial connections between the possession of moral or phenomenal knowledge, and the satisfaction of cognitively neutral conditions of desire and experiential history. The existence of such connections in the moral case makes for an efficient dissolution of the so-called moral problem. (shrink)

Whataboutism, eine weit verbreitete Argumentationsstrategie in Debatten über den Israel-Gaza-Krieg, lenkt oft durch Gegenfragen von der eigentlichen Kritik ab. Doch trotz seines schlechten Rufs kann Whataboutism auch positive Auswirkungen haben.

Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in the principles that govern counterfactuals on the basis that intuitions support that principle. This is because there are pairs of competing counterfactuals that appear to be equally acceptable. In doing so, he was forced to introduced semantic vagueness into his system of counterfactuals. In this paper it is argued that there is a simpler and purely epistemic explanation of these cases that avoids the need for introducing semantic vagueness into the (...) semantics for counterfactuals. (shrink)

Philosophers conceptualize a lot, generate, analyze, and engineer concepts. They often either equate ‘words’ and ‘concepts’ or consider words only as means of expression of their ‘concepts’. I suggest that philosophers should learn to distinguish between ‘words’ and ‘concepts’. Philosophers’ terms are often incompatible or partially incompatible with philosophers’ ‘concepts’. Examples are ‘isms’ in philosophy and the conception of reason. If ‘talking about the same matter’ is a prerequisite for fruitful philosophical debates, words and their analysis should have at least (...) some limiting and guiding power over concepts. (shrink)

In recent decades, perspectivism has developed into an independent epistemological research program. Perspectivism is based on the idea of perspective as an attempt to elucidate an object from a multitude of factors. Perspectivists are concerned with reconstructing and explaining these factors, identifying the conditioning of epistemic acts, using concepts such as “position”/“point of view,” “gaze,” “angle of view,” “horizon,” “focus,” “picture,” “relativity,” and “context”. Although these concepts are part of the perspectivist's toolkit, their content and interrelationship have not yet been (...) critically and comprehensively analyzed. The purpose of this article is to clarify the conceptual basis of perspectivism as an epistemological program, which began in the works of F. Kaulbach (1990) and W. Stegmaier (2008). For this purpose, a systematic conceptual analysis will be carried out, a detailed presentation of the logical content of perspectivist notions and their reduction into a single coherent model, which can become the conceptual basis of perspectivism. Perspectivist concepts constitute a “population” or matrix of the concept “epistemic situation”. Being consistently expounded and correlated in a conceptual model, they can be used as a tool for a detailed analysis of epistemic situations and their results (theories, positions, views, etc.). The final part of the article will formulate a number of significant implications of the new programmatic understanding of perspectivism: the status of perspectivist concepts, the distinction of perspectivism from similar epistemological programs, and the challenges for its further development. (shrink)

The concept of epistemic defeat or defeasibility has come to occupy an important place in contemporary epistemology, especially in relation to the closely allied concepts of justified belief, warrant, and knowledge. These allied concepts signify positive epistemic appraisal or positive epistemic status. As a first approximation, defeasibility refers to a belief’s liability to lose some positive epistemic status, or to having this status downgraded in some particular way. For example, a person may be epistemically justified in believing some proposition p (...) at one time, but then the belief might become less justified or even unjustified at some later time. Moreover, beliefs may also be prevented from having or acquiring some positive epistemic status in the first place. So more generally, defeasibility refers to a kind of epistemic liability or vulnerability, the potential of loss, reduction, or prevention of some positive epistemic status. A defeater is, broadly speaking, a condition that actualizes this potential. This article begins by outlining two general types of defeaters: propositional defeaters and mental state defeaters. Propositional defeaters are conditions external to the perspective of the cognizer that prevent an overall justified true belief from counting as knowledge. Mental state defeaters are conditions internal to the perspective of the cognizer (such as experiences, beliefs, withholdings) that cancel, reduce, or even prevent justification. (shrink)

One important element in Lonergan’s philosophical work is the attempt to demonstrate the essential continuity between Aristotle’s thought and the explanatory viewpoint of modern science. Among other things, this attempt is meant to serve a two-fold purpose: first of all, to defend both Aristotle’s intellectualist metaphysics and the explanatory aspirations of modern science over against the caricatured representations of each which grew out of the Renaissance debate between the Aristotelians and the proponents of modern science; and secondly, to demonstrate the (...) intrinsic limitations of modern scientific humanism in much the same way that Aquinas tried to demonstrate the essential incompleteness of Aristotle’s non-Christian world view. Now Gadamer would not deny that there is an essential continuity in thought from Aristotle to modern science; in fact, he explicitly affirms such a continuity. And like Lonergan, Gadamer insists that modern science must play a legitimate, though restricted, role within contemporary culture. Given these and other important similarities between Gadamer and Lonergan, it may be difficult to see just where the grounds for possible disagreement lie. As a result, Gadamer’s reservations concerning Lonergan’s philosophical project may appear to be somewhat puzzling. In what follows, I shall try to shed light on some of the reasons for Gadamer’s reservations. (shrink)

Realism about affirmations of a given type is the view that these affirmations are to be understood as assertions that attempt to describe a largely independent reality, and that they are correct if and only if they manage to do so (regardless of whether they can be known to be correct). Objectivisim about affirmations of a given type is the view that they are subject to adequate, non-arbitrary standards of correctness, and that there are a significant number of non-trivial affirmations (...) of this type that can be known to be correct. On this understanding, realism, objectivism, and their denials can be combined in four possible ways: realism with objectivism, realism with antiobjectivism, antirealism with objectivism, and antirealism with antiobjectivism. This paper clarifies the distinction between realism and objectivism, illustrates it applications in various fields of philosophy, and draws attention to its value. (shrink)

The existing body of scholarship on Kant’s Critique of Judgment is rife with disagreement. At the centre of much of this disagreement is the issue of precisely what Kant understands to be taking place in a harmonization of the cognitive faculties. Is aesthetic reflective judgment to be identified with, or separated from, this harmonious state of the faculties of imagination and understanding? If aesthetic judgment is identified with this state, as is argued herein, then upon what is a judgment of (...) beauty to be based? These questions are addressed by focussing on two closely related aspects of Kant’s theory of reflective judgment; the role Kant assigns to the power of desire (i.e., to the will) and to the causal structure implicated in reflective judgment. In brief, we argue that a judgment of beauty is not, strictly speaking, something that I do, but is better described that something that happens of itself. (shrink)

This paper investigates Kant’s account of “real essence” and of a thing’s “nature”. Notwithstanding their wide negligence in the literature, these concepts belong to the central ones of Kant’s metaphysics. I argue that, on the one hand, Kant is in continuity with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of essence. But, on the other hand, he also follows Locke in distinguishing between “logical” and “real” essence. Contrary to recent attempts of aligning real essence with contemporary approaches to essence, I will defend the thesis (...) that Kant equates real essence and (formal) nature, and that real essence has a causal, but no constitutive role. I shall also respond to potential objections and discuss some developments of Kant’s views. (shrink)

In this paper I explain and defend the content and justification of John Rawls's conception of human rights, as he outlines it in his major work: The Law of Peoples. I focus, in particular, on the criticisms of Allen Buchanan. Buchanan distinguishes four lines of argument that Rawls uses to derive what, according to Buchanan, is a 'lean' list of human rights : the Political Conception Argument, the Associationist Argument, the Cooperation Argument, and finally the Functionalist Argument. In each case (...) Buchanan proceeds to show how the premises of Rawls's argument lead to absurd consequences if taken to their logical conclusion. It can be shown, however, that the reason these consequences follow is that Buchanan misunderstands and misrepresents Rawls's premises. (shrink)

According to panpsychists, physical phenomena are, at bottom, nothing but experiential phenomena. One argument for this view proceeds from an alleged need for physical phenomena to have features beyond what physics attributes to them; another starts by arguing that consciousness is ubiquitous, and proposes an identification of physical and experiential phenomena as the best explanation of this alleged fact. The first argument assumes that physical phenomena have categorical natures, and the second that the world’s experience-causing powers or potentials underdetermine its (...) physical features. I argue that panpsychists are not entitled to these assumptions. (shrink)

The history of the methodology of African philosophy can be divided into two periods: the nascent stage that’s characterized by a rigor-demand, and the contemporary stage that’s characterized by a relevance-demand. In this, paper, I argue for one way to strike the appropriate balance between relevance and rigor in African philosophy. Specifically, I argue that the unconscious rejection of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method by contemporary African philosophers played a major role in how African philosophy came to be characterized (...) by a relevance-demand. Consequently, I submit that even though being only or excessively relevance-oriented is not bad, African philosophy would become rich enough to compete with other regional philosophies—Western, Chinese, and so on—if it re-installs conceptual analysis as part of its methodology. (shrink)

Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental object” has always puzzled interpreters. On the one hand, he says that the transcendental object is the object to which we relate our representations. On the other hand, he declares the transcendental object to be unknowable and identifies it with the thing in itself. I argue that this poses a problem that Kant only in the B edition of the Critique solves in a satisfactory manner. According to this solution, we ascribe sensible predicates to things (...) in themselves, but only insofar as they appear. I conclude that this could motivate a phenomenalist account of Kant’s idealism, but one that gives due weight to the role of things in themselves. (shrink)

There are long-standing doubts about whether data from subjective scales—for instance, self-reports of happiness—are cardinally comparable. It is unclear how to assess whether these doubts are justified without first addressing two unresolved theoretical questions: how do people interpret subjective scales? Which assumptions are required for cardinal comparability? This paper offers answers to both. It proposes an explanation for scale interpretation derived from philosophy of language and game theory. In short: conversation is a cooperative endeavour governed by various maxims (Grice 1989); (...) because subjective scales are vague and individuals want to make themselves understood, scale interpretation is a search for a focal point (Schelling 1960). A specific focal point it hypothesised; if this hypothesis is correct, subjective data will be cardinally comparable. Four individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for cardinal comparability are specified. The paper then argues this hypothesis can be empirically be tested, makes an initial attempt to do so using subjective well-being data, and concludes it is supported. Numerous areas for further research are identified including, at the end of the paper, how certain tests could be used to ‘correct’ subjective data if they are not cardinal. (shrink)